



Why Food ?

Industry Concentration

- 84% of US cattle in southwest
- 78% of chickens in SE Atlantic region
- Cattle feedlots hold 300,000 head
- 78% of US beef stock through 2% of feedlots
- 10,000 hogs and 100,000 birds together






Impact of Chemicals

- 800 deaths, 20,000 ill, toxic cooking oil, Spain, 1981
- 1373 ill from watermelon with aldicard, USA, 1985


International Impact

- Staphylococcus, mushrooms canned in China, 1989
- Cyclospora from Guatemalan raspberries1996-97
- Salmonella in mangos from Mexico, 1999
- Cholera, frozen coconut milk from Thailand, 1991
- Shigella and E. coli in parsley from Mexico, 1998
- Salmonella from Mexican cantaloupe, 2000



Agricultural BW

- WWI- Germany, anthrax and glanders
- WWII- Germany, FMD and potato beetles
- Japanese disseminated infected wheat millet, contaminated cotton, anthrax, glanders
- Iraq- wheat stem rust and camel pox



Non-State Terrorists


- 1978- Israeli citrus contaminated with mercury
- 1985- Sri Lankan tea threatened with cyanide
- 1989- Chilean grapes with cyanide
- 1989- "Breeders" claim to release Med fruit fly in CA





The Dalles, OR 1984



- 751 people
- Salmonellosis
- Associated with salad bars
- Extensive investigation









Threats to Use CW


- 1984- Animal Liberation Front in UK claims to contaminate Mars candy with rat poison to protest research with monkeys. Found to be hoax.
- 1991- ALF threatens to contaminate popular drink "Lucozade". No contaminated bottles found.
- 1992- Animal Rights Militia claims to inject liquid cleaner in "Cold Buster" bars in Canada. Determined to be hoax.

Response to the Threat


Problem? Just Call...

Open-faced meat sandwich producers are inspected daily by the USDA. If it's closed face, they're inspected by the FDA once every 5 years...

If it's beef broth it's regulated by the FDA, and if it's chicken broth it's the USDA, unless they're dehydrated, in which case it's the opposite...




	_		
WHO	JECFA	SALMSURV	GSFS
FAO	JMPR	IHR	GAO
PPS	JEMRA	CDC	RCED
APHD	OIE	BPRO	DOJ
WHA	IPCS	FoodNet	FBI
UNEP	INTOX	NARMS	OCI
IUFOST	GEMS	HACCP	FERRET
IUPAC	IAEA	FDA	OIG
WMO	OCHA	USDA	ARS
OECD	GPHIN	FSIS	OEP
*The Deputy Assistant to the Assistant Deputy Administrator for District Enforcement Operations agreed with this report			



40% of consumers thought food suppliers, retailers and the government had the greatest responsibility to ensure that food eaten at home was safe

-Redmond, JFP, 2003





Surveillance

- Data reported at state level
- Traditionally "passive"
- Relies on laboratories
- Not very timely

Surveillance

- "Notifiable Diseases"
- Outbreaks
- Legal and psychological barriers





SODA

- Salmonella outbreak detection algorithm
- All human isolates in US subtyped
- Computer algorithm to detect unusual clusters
- Increase rates over expected are investigated
- Several large outbreaks have been detected



- Public health and veterinary labs
- "Molecular fingerprinting"
- Electronic networking of labs
- Clusters frequently investigated

FoodNet

- Part of CDC Emerging Infections Program
- Population-based active surveillance
- 10 sites, 13% of US population
- More timely and complete

Communications

- Public health
- Regulatory agencies
- Law enforcement
- Emergency response
- Medical infrastructure
- Industry
- Public / media

Surveillance Goals

- Real-time data sharing
- Integration with veterinary data
- Improved linkage to other systems
 - Government
 - Coroners
 - Absenteeism
 - Industries



Epidemiologic Investigation

- Objectives same whether unintentional or covert
 - Identify causative agent
 - Vehicle
 - Manner of contamination
 - Facilitate treatment
 - Remove product from circulation

Epidemiologic Investigation

- Case finding
- Evaluate exposure data
- Case-control studies
- Collect samples
- Coordinate with law enforcement, regulatory authorities and medical

Reported Outbreaks

- Only 32% have a known etiology
- Only half have an identified vehicle

Clues to Bioterrorism


- Rare or novel disease
- Non-endemic area
- Out of season
- Unusual drug resistance
- Unusual epidemiologic features
- Unusual clinical presentation

Recognition of An Attack

- Announced / threatened:
 - Law enforcement + public health
 - Assess credibility
 - Enhance security
 - Surveillance for cases
- Covert attack:
 - Initial public health response
 - Will be detected as if unintentional
 - Rapidity will depend on infrastructure

Recent Investigations

- 1988 to 1999 CDC / EIS outbreaks
- 1,099 investigations
- 44 caused by potential BT bugs
- 55% reported by medical providers or health departments





Public Health / Establishment Relations

- Epidemiologists are not "regulatory"
- We never meet until there is a disaster
- We are on the same side
- Early cooperation > less pain in end

Conclusions

- The threat is real
- Investment in infrastructure will help us all
- Intentional events may initially be indistinguishable from intentional
- Rapid epidemiologic response will limit casualties
- Multi-agency response is critical